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European Monetary Integration after EU Enlargement 
  by Klaus-Jürgen Gern, Felix Hammermann, Rainer Schweickert, and Lúcio 
Vinhas de Souza 
CONTENTS 
  Expectations about additional short-run gains 
from joining monetary union should not be too 
optimistic. Most of the expected gains from a 
monetary union are largely endogenous to cre-
dible, time-consistent domestic policies. Mere 
euro area membership is not a replacement for 
that. However, monetary integration has a role in 
supporting such policies and completing mone-
tary integration, i.e., introducing the common cur-
rency can lock in the gains realized so far.  
  The new member states made considerable pro-
gress with respect to the monetary and fiscal 
Maastricht criteria but inflation is still a concern 
in some countries and fiscal deficits are conside-
rably too high for the majority of countries. 
However, experience with the run-up to EMU in 
the second half of the nineties shows that disin-
flation and fiscal consolidation can be achieved 
without major damage to growth. Additionally, 
structural real appreciation is unlikely to lead to 
an inconsistency of the inflation and the exchange 
rate targets. 
  The experience with the currency board systems 
in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria reveals no 
evidence that the absence of an active exchange 
rate policy exacerbated the effects of external 
shocks. However, at the same time, the discipline 
demanded by the currency board system may 
have supported structural reforms. Hence, for 
countries which are determined to introduce the 
euro a currency board system may help to 
establish and maintain credibility within a con-
sistent macroeconomic strategy. 
  The experience with inflation targeting in Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and, more recently, Hungary 
shows that inflation targeting in general works 
successfully: it is not too soft because the 
Maastricht criteria guide the inflation target and it 
is not too rigid because new member states still 
need to establish credibility. The three countries 
should enhance the credibility of the inflation tar-
geting regimes by thorough banking supervision 
and thorough fiscal policy.  
  There is no generally superior exchange rate 
regime that provides a golden way to bridge the 
transition period to full EMU membership. While 
there is no reason to view monetary integration 
with rose-tinted glasses, there is also no reason to 
believe that joining the ERM  II is sufficient to 
provide a safe haven with respect to financial 
stability. Even countries with sound and con-
sistent macroeconomic policies and fulfilling all 
criteria—be it Copenhagen or Maastricht—will 
still run the risk that markets turn against them.  
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st, 2004, 10 countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) joined the European Union (EU). Following the full integration into 
the Community policies, the EU institutions, and its financing system, albeit with transitional 
arrangements in some areas, a next step of integration will be on the monetary side. The new member 
states (NMS) are expected to join the second Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), although not 
necessarily immediately, and the membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) implies 
the eventual adoption of the euro as a legal tender. 
While the effect of EU accession on the old member states (OMS) is significant as regards the 
institutional set-up of the EU and the fiscal implications, the impact of monetary integration of the 
NMS on the conduct of monetary policy will be small. Due to the small size of the NMS economies—
the combined GDP of all 10 NMS represents only less than 5 percent of EU-15 GDP and less than 
6 percent of euro area GDP—diverging developments in the NMS with regard to growth or inflation 
will hardly be visible in EU or euro area aggregates. Even if, for example, NMS inflation were 
3  percentage points above the average inflation rate in the current euro area member states—a 
considerable difference given the current relatively small inflation differential between most NMS and 
the euro area—this would lift the aggregate euro area (including NMS) inflation only by 0.2 
percentage points. Therefore, significant changes in the stance of monetary policy cannot be expected 
as a result of accession of the NMS to the euro area, and core policy parameters such as the inflation 
target or the assumption about underlying potential output growth need not be revised just because of 
the introduction of the euro in some or all of the NMS.1  
Consequently, in the following we will focus on the implications of European monetary integration 
for the NMS. The central presumption behind the pursuit of eventually introducing the single currency 
is that significant potential net benefits are expected to be associated with monetary integration 
stemming from (1) gains in trade and growth, (2) positive credibility effects, and (3) reduction in the 
risk of exchange rate crises. These arguments are reviewed in Section 2 of this paper. In Section 3, we 
briefly set out the institutional framework for monetary integration of the NMS and check the 
economies for the Maastricht criteria. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of different approaches to 
bridging the transition to the single currency. The advantages and pitfalls of alternative strategies of 
monetary integration are discussed focusing on early euroization (i.e., implementation of currency 
boards) as the one extreme route taken by some NMS and inflation targeting regimes as the other. The 
paper concludes with Section 5 which summarizes the main results of the discussion. 
2  Net Benefits of Joining EMU? 
Integrating into a monetary union with a stable currency can have three major advantages (Backé and 
Wójcik 2004). First, monetary integration is expected to generate trade and growth gains, driven by 
lower transaction costs. Second, joining a monetary union can have positive credibility effects. Third, 
participation in monetary union reduces the risk of exchange rate crises, which is particularly relevant 
for cases of sudden shifts in sentiment leading to abrupt stops or reversals in capital flows, and 
consequently to a currency crisis. 
____________________ 
1 This does not preclude the discussion of these issues due to other reasons, such as the composition of the ECB Governing 
Council with the addition of the NMS and the potential effects of this on interest rate decisions, albeit the proposed reform of 
the Council composition aims to address some of these potential questions. 4 
Concerning potential trade and growth gains, Rose (2000) found that the trade effects of using a 
common currency are positive, statistically significant, and very high: he estimated that countries with 
a common currency trade over three times more than countries using different currencies. Frankel and 
Rose (2000) found the same and also that this additional trade has substantial positive effects on 
growth. However, subsequent studies came up with results that indicate either small, negative or 
nonsignificant trade effects from a monetary union (Nitsch 2002, 2004; Pakko and Wall 2001; Persson 
2001). Looking specifically at the early euro area experience, Vinhas de Souza (2002) and De Sousa 
and Disdier (2002) found negative or nonsignificant trade effects, while Micco et al. (2003) found 
small but significant positive effects. Some of those results may suggest that participation in a 
monetary union could hold some potential positive trade (and, eventually, growth) effects, although 
there is limited knowledge concerning to what extent these effects may be distributed among the 
countries participating in a monetary union and also concerning the time profile of these eventual 
gains, i.e., how quickly these effects would take to eventually materialize.  
A look at trade and growth data for EU-15, i.e., the old member states (OMS), is also not 
encouraging. Figure 1 shows that intra-OMS trade in relation to GDP increased after the crisis of ERM 
I. However, the cyclical development of the trade data seems to be driven by the periodic swings in the 
dollar exchange rate of the DM and the euro, respectively. At least, the de facto introduction of 
monetary union by fixing exchange rates in 1999 did not prevent intra-EMU trade from falling. 
Growth data tell the same story. Real growth of the euro area (and especially of its larger economies) 
has also underperformed the growth in the non-euro area EU member states. Hence, no apparent 
growth-boosting effects from the monetary union seem to have been observed in OMS. Additionally, 
the OMS area is already the largest trade partner of all NMS. In 2003, the nonweighted average of 
exports (imports) to the OMS was 63 (61) percent of their total exports (imports). Most of the 
adjustment of trade flows towards the OMS took place rather quickly, and was actually mostly 
completed by the mid-1990s. In relative terms, trade flows seem to have already stabilized by the end 
of the 1990s.  
Figure 1: 
Intra-EU-15 and Intra-Euro Area Trade, 1990–2003 
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Source: IMF (2004a, 2004b); own calculations. 5 
Figure 2: 
Real Effective Exchange Rates (unweighted averages)a, 1990–2004 
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aAnnual real effective exchange rates are based on the trade-weighted nominal exchange rates, divided by a price deflator. 
Source: IMF (2004b); own calculations. 
One reason why positive effects from monetary union may provide a lower benchmark for the effect 
generally to be expected becomes evident if one looks at the underlying transmission mechanism 
which is mostly neglected in empirical studies. The trade gains expected from a monetary union are 
assumed to be related to the trading costs which, in turn, are imposed by real exchange rate instability. 
Figure 2a shows that real effective exchange rate changes have been rather small in the OMS and have 
become rather more synchronized between EMU and non-EMU after 1999. The changes for the NMS 
are clearly larger and dominated by an increasing trend, related to (a) the long-run catch-up process 
(EMU participation, obviously, should not aim to affect this long-run process driven by economic 
fundamentals) and (b) the recovery from their substantial “entry” devaluations in the early 1990s. 
Hence, real exchange rate changes were significant but rather predictable.  
Figure 2b shows the yearly standard deviation of the real exchange rates as a measure of uncertainty 
related to the development of real exchange rates. According to this proxy, uncertainty should have 
been lowest in EMU countries but, again, there is no significant effect of monetary union.2 The 
volatility observed among the NMS is still somewhat above the one observed for the euro area 
members, but has already fallen to values quite similar to those observed among the non-EMU 
countries, and that from much higher average values at the beginning. 
Taking this eclectic evidence together implies that for the NMS, which have already borne the cost 
of real exchange rate adjustment, additional benefits from joining EMU are rather low. However, the 
whole process of adjustment was—for most of the NMS—always driven by the desire to integrate 
with OMS and to join the EU. At least to some extent, it was always clear that this also requires 
monetary integration and it is still a formidable challenge to preserve what has been achieved so far. 
Joining monetary union would surely help. 
____________________ 
2 The difference between the two groups is actually smaller after 1999. This effect, however, is essentially due to the high 
volatility of the non-EMU currencies in 1992, the year of the ERM I crisis. 6 
This leads to the second expected benefit of joining the euro area: credibility gains. The argument 
here is that joining a monetary union solves the credibility problems of dynamically inconsistent 
monetary authorities, eliminating the potential inflationary bias.3 Such credibility gains—together with 
the reduction of the interest risk premium, due to the elimination of the exchange rate risk—would 
lead to a reduction of the level and of the variability of real long-run interest rates, which, in turn, is 
expected to stimulate investments and, consequently, growth. 
Obviously, the significance and the size of these effects depend on the degree of credibility a 
country’s policies enjoy in the first place. Here, one must note that most of the NMS have made 
substantial progress towards achieving macroeconomic stability. EU accession may have played a role in 
this process, acting as an anchor for market expectations, as the external constraints that result from the 
accession process help to solve some of the commitment problems of monetary and fiscal authorities, 
beyond helping institution-building and structural reforms (this may be particularly true concerning 
central bank independence, see Vinhas de Souza and Ledrut (2004) and Cukierman et al. (2002)).  
Actual European Union membership and, in particular, participation in the surveillance mechanism 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) framework are expected to further enhance the credibility of 
the NMS’s macroeconomic policies (if the weakening of the mechanism caused by, particularly, the 
German and French repeated breaches of the SGP mandated limits on budget deficits and public debt 
stocks does not continue). But, again, the linkage of credibility and EMU is not straightforward, as, in 
essence, credibility is largely endogenous to the soundness and consistency of the overall economic 
policy mix over time.  
The long-term interest rates volatility series (here represented by the yield on 10-year government 
bonds) in Figure 3a illustrate this point. The values for the OMS countries are indistinguishable, and 
no breaks after 1999 are observed. Here, the comparison with the NMS is complicated by the fact that 
most of them still do not issue comparable government instruments.4 Nevertheless, keeping in mind 
those very substantial sample limitations, the level of the long-term interest rates for those NMS is 
already strikingly similar to the one observed among the OMS.  
Figure 3b reveals that in half of the years of the sample, non-euro EU-15 countries actually show a 
lower volatility of long-term interest rates than the one observed by the euro area countries for which 
the SGP is, in theory at least, binding. More than that, again the difference between the pre and post 
EMU periods is not significant. This is possibly related to the worsening fiscal situation in several 
OMS participating in the euro area. Always keeping in mind the sample limitations for the NMS 
described above; the volatility of the NMS is also rather similar to the one observed among the OMS. 
A rather intuitive conclusion is that most of the expected gains from a monetary union are actually 
largely endogenous to the soundness and consistency of the overall (and, therefore, also national) 
economic policy mix, and, therefore can be achieved by credible, time-consistent domestic policies.5 
The framework for entry into the EU and into monetary union should have helped significantly to 
formulate and sustain such policies. Hence, the NMS should already have reaped most of the potential 
gains from monetary integration. Further gains may, therefore, be rather low, but to complete mone- 
 
____________________ 
3 This is only true if the country in question joins a monetary union that does not suffer from a dynamic inconsistency 
problem. 
4 Only two of them have 10-year government bonds, the yields of which are used as benchmark long-term interest rates. In 
the figures the candidate country Bulgaria is included in order to increase the sample size. Bulgaria, however, had its figures 
distorted by the 1997–1998 hyper inflationary episode when yields on government bonds, to compensate for the price 
increases, increased and then fell abruptly in the swift price stabilization following the introduction of the currency board. 
5 Van Foreest and de Vries (2004) provide evidence, using a panel data set of OMS and NMS, that the choice of the foreign 
exchange regime is not of first-order importance for achieving high output growth, as, given the forward-looking nature of 
the foreign exchange market, exchange rate stability hinges on the current and anticipated coherency of monetary and fiscal 
policies. This might explain also why some of those gains have, so far, been proved so elusive to the euro area countries: they 
lack consistent domestic policies, and just euro area membership is not a replacement for that. 7 
Figure 3: 
Long-term Interest Rates (unweighted averages)a, 1997–2004 










1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 










   
 Euro  area 
  Non-euro EU-15  
 CEEC-3b   
aAnnual long-term interest rates are represented by the yield on 10-year government bonds. — bDue to data availability of 
10-year government bonds, CEEC-3 is the average of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 
Source: IMF (2004b); own calculations. 
tary integration may, at the same time, be important in order to lock in the gains achieved so far. It 
could be at least doubted whether membership in the ERM II could provide such a result. 
This basically relates to the reduction of the risk of currency crises, the third potential gain from 
monetary union. Independent from monetary union, the likelihood of excessive capital inflows and 
sudden capital flow reversals can be reduced by national policies like pursuing sound macroeconomic 
policies, by avoiding unsustainable exchange rate regimes, by measures that strengthen the domestic 
financial sector and its supervisory institutions.6 Nevertheless, one must recognize that, even after 
such measures, the risks of exchange rate shocks unrelated to fundamentals remain.7  
Apart from entering EMU, an alternative way for the NMS to deal with this remaining risk is to use 
the framework for monetary and exchange rate policy provided by the European Union without the 
euro area. However, the ERM II can only contain such risks if it were operated in a way which 
provides protection against speculative attacks that are not related to fundamentals or to unsustainable 
policies. This is clearly not the case. The European Central Bank (ECB) can always opt out from the 
obligation to intervene if it claims that further intervention would endanger the value of the euro. 
Hence, the NMS cannot rely on the ECB and still run significant risks during the transition to full 
EMU membership even in the case of perfectly stable economies. This raises the question of how 
____________________ 
6  On this point, perhaps the most visible change since the introduction of the euro is the substantial deepening of the 
European fixed-income markets, both government and private (Galati and Tsatsaronis 2003), with also presumed potential 
growth-enhancing effects at some point in the future. Nevertheless, this process was not only caused by the introduction of 
the euro but also by the EU’s continuous efforts towards economic integration and harmonization (the recommendations 
arising from the Lamfalussy report (Lamfalussy 2001) being the latest in this area).  
7 One must note that the exchange rate regime can actually act as commitment device, reinforcing capital reversals that are 
based on changes in fundamentals (for instance, time-inconsistent policies): here, the currency crisis forces the necessary 
adjustment (for instance, Portugal’s 1982/83 experience as opposed to the 2001/02 one). 8 
close to heaven the NMS have already got (Section 3) and what strategies they apply in order to 
manage the transition (Section 4). 
3  The Institutional Framework—Convergence Criteria and the ERM II 
With accession to the EU, the NMS are fully integrated into the Community policies, the EU 
institutions, and its financing system although certain transitional arrangements apply to them, most 
notably concerning labor mobility and the Common Agricultural Policy. The process of integration in-
to the regular economic policy coordination procedures—the core element being the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines—has been gradually faded in and is scheduled to be completed in autumn 2004 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2003: 17). After having published three Pre-Accession Economic Programmes 
which had been one important element of the dialogue on macroeconomic and financial stability 
launched in 2001,8 the NMS have submitted their first convergence programs under the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This procedure reflects the fact that the NMS upon accession have immediately joined 
EMU and their central banks have become members of the European System of Central Banks 
(Eurosystem). However, for the time being the NMS have the status of member states with a de-
rogation pursuant to Article 122 of the EC Treaty, i.e., the euro is still not a legal tender.  
In contrast to the founding member states of EMU, the NMS de jure do not have the right to opt out 
of the euro; there will be no separate decision on the introduction of the euro. As the inclusion in the 
ERM II is a necessary precondition of introducing the euro and will take place only on request of the 
applicant country, the NMS, however, de facto have discretion to decide on the introduction of the 
euro. Participation in the ERM II with keeping the exchange rate within the normal fluctuation bands 
for two years without tensions and devaluation is the key indicator in the assessment of exchange rate 
stability and constitutes one of the so-called Maastricht criteria, which have to be fulfilled before 
introduing the euro. Unilaterally adopting the euro as a legal tender (euroization) is not acceptable 
from the standpoint of the Eurosystem and contradicts the “spirit of the Treaty” (Deutsche Bundes-
bank 2003: 19), which demands sufficient convergence in terms of nominal developments before 
introducing the euro.  
Participation in the ERM II will have different implications for the currency regime in the NMS 
depending on the current exchange rate regimes (Table 1). No change will be necessary for the 
Estonian and Lithuanian currency board systems as the EU authorities, in their decision on the in-
clusion of the kroon and the tolar in the ERM II on June 27, 2004, have ruled that these are compatible 
with the ERM II. For Cyprus and Hungary, the consequences will be small, as they already have 
pegged their currencies to the euro with a corresponding fluctuation band.9 The credibility of the 
exchange rate regime may rise, however, since in the ERM II the ECB is also obliged to intervene at 
the margin unless interventions do not interfere with the primary objective of price level stability.10 
Latvia will have to switch from IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to the euro as the foreign reserve 
currency of its currency board system and Malta will have to peg its lira to the euro instead of the 
current currency basket. For the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland the inclusion into the  
____________________ 
8 For details on the dialogue see Deutsche Bundesbank (2001). 
9 Inclusion in the ERM II may, however, be associated with an adjustment of the central parity, such as recently done in the 
case of Slovenia where the chosen central parity in the ERM II represented a small revaluation compared to the previous 
target exchange rate. 
10 The potential expansion of the euro area money supply due to exchange interventions at the bottom end of the fluctuation 
bands is, however, probably too small to pose a serious risk to price level stability in the euro area, given the small size of the 
NMS—their M1 money stock is only between 0.1 percent and 1.2 percent in relation to the euro area money supply 
(Kontolemis 2003: Box 5).  9 
Table 1: 
Currency Regimes in New Member States and Euro Introduction Target Dates 
Country Current  exchange   
rate system 
Notes  Euro introduction  
target date 
Cyprus  Exchange rate band  ± 15 percent around central parity to the euro  No date specified 
Czech Republic  Managed floating    2009–2010 
Estonia  Currency board  Peg to the euro; since June 27, 2004, 
participation in the ERM II  
2006 
Hungary  Exchange rate band  ± 15 percent around central parity to the euro  2008 
Latvia  Peg  Peg to IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR)  Not before 2008 
Lithuania  Currency board  Peg to the euro since February 2002, peg to  
the US dollar before; since June 27, 2004, 
participation in the ERM II 
2006a 
Malta  Peg  Peg to currency basket containing 70 percent 
euro, 20 percent sterling, 10 percent US dollar 
No date specified 
Poland Free  floating    2008–2009 
Slovakia  Managed floating  Euro as official anchor currency since 1999  2008–2009 
Slovenia  Exchange rate band  Since June 27, 2004, ± 15 percent around a 
central parity to the euro within the ERM II; 
managed floating before 
2006a 
aImplied by the inclusion in the ERM II as of June 27, 2004, although officially no date is specified. 
Source: Homepages of the national central banks; European Commission (2003).  
ERM II will mean switching to a currency peg (although with relatively wide fluctuation bands) from 
a regime of managed or free floating. While Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia have already been 
included into the ERM II, the other NMS governments have generally set target dates for the intro-
duction of the euro as a legal tender such that participation in the ERM II will not be necessary before 
2006.  
When the countries’ currencies participate in the ERM II, in addition to the criterion of keeping the 
exchange rate within the “normal” fluctuation bands11 for two years without tensions or devaluation, 
convergence will be evaluated at regular intervals according to four other criteria two of them relating 
to monetary developments and two of them relating to the fiscal position.  
1. The rate of inflation in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) may not exceed 
the average rate of inflation in the three best-performing member states of the Eurosystem by more 
than 1.5 percentage points. 
2. Long-term interest rates may not exceed long-term interest rates in those three countries by more 
than 200 basis points. 
3. The government budget deficit in terms of the Maastricht definition may not exceed 3 percent in 
relation to GDP unless it is falling substantially or it is only temporarily above and still close to the 
level. 
4. The level of public debt in relation to GDP may not exceed 60 percent unless it is falling at a 
satisfactory pace. 
____________________ 
11 It is not entirely clear what normal fluctuation bands are in this context. While the Treaty does not explicitly refer to 
margins narrower than ± 15 percent, some argue that keeping the exchange rate within the original ± 2.25 percent fluctuation 
bands of the ERM I will be necessary to qualify in terms of exchange rate stability (Euractiv 2003). The European 
Commission (2000: Annex D3) elaborates on the interpretation of the exchange rate criterion after the widening of the 
fluctuation bands and summarizes that, while maintaining the exchange rate within a fluctuation band of ± 2.25 percent 
should be the rule, “[h]owever, the extent to which a breach of the +/– 2.25 % fluctuation band would correspond to severe 
tensions would take into account a range of relevant considerations. A distinction is to be made between exchange rate 
movements at the upper margin and movements below the 2.25 % lower margin” (European Commission 2002: Annex D3). 10 
In addition to these criteria which are at the center of public attention, according to the provisions of 
Article 121, EC Treaty, other elements such as “…the results of the integration of markets, the 
situation and development of the balance of payments on current account, and … the development of 
unit labour costs and other price indices” will be taken into account in the assessment of the quality of 
the achieved convergence. Some of these indicators, notably the current account balance, which 
displays a high deficit in the order of 5–10 percent of GDP in a number of NMS, could point to 
significant weaknesses, although the deficits are financed to a large extent by net foreign direct 
investment flows. However, the evaluation of developments in the mentioned “weak” indicators in-
volves a complex judgment, and history suggests that they probably will not be really important in the 
decision on participation in the euro.12 Therefore, in the following we will concentrate on the evalu-
ation of the current progress with respect to the four Maastricht criteria above.  
As concerns the monetary criteria, the convergence has proceeded relatively well, given the high 
inflation imminent in a number of countries during the early phase of transition in the nineties. In 
2003, already in six out of ten NMS (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Poland) 
HICP inflation was lower than the critical value (Table 2). That said, European Commission forecasts 
suggest that the proportion of the NMS complying with the Maastricht inflation criterion will decline 
to four and three out of ten in 2004 and 2005, respectively. This development is to some extent due to 
the fact that lower expected inflation in the euro area countries will reduce the critical value. More 
important, however, is an expected pickup in inflation in the NMS. This acceleration is partly due to 
rising inflationary pressures reflecting increased utilization of capacities as a result of active foreign 
demand as well as monetary and/or fiscal stimulus in a number of countries. Another factor, which is 
less problematic from the point of view of nominal convergence, are changes in the tax system and 
increases or deregulation of administered prices, partly related to EU accession. It has also been noted 
that currency devaluation in the past has been an important source of inflationary pressures, particular-
ly in Hungary and in Slovenia (Coricelli et al. 2004). Entering the ERM II might therefore contribute 
to disinflation in these countries. Given that Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece all had similarly high 
inflation rates 3–5 years before the decision on their membership in the euro area, achieving an in-
flation rate which would qualify for introducing the euro generally seems to be within reach for the 
NMS. This view is supported by the development of long-term interest rates, which have converged 
markedly in recent years. In 2003, the criterion on interest rates was fulfilled in every NMS except 
Hungary. 
On the fiscal side, the criterion on public debt does not seem to be critical in most NMS as the debt-
to-GDP ratio in 2003 was below 60 percent in all countries except Cyprus and Malta, although only by 
a small margin in Hungary, and is expected to remain generally stable. As concerns the budget balance 
the situation is reassuring in the Baltic states and in Slovenia, where the deficit was safely below 3 
percent in 2003 and is expected to remain so this year and next (Table 3).13 However, high deficits are 
registered for the remaining countries.14 As a result the European Commission launched excessive 
deficit procedures in the case of six countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and 
Slovakia) under the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. According to this, a deficit in excess of 3 
percent of GDP generally has to be corrected during the following year, but it is understood that the 
NMS will be given more time in view of their position as countries still being in transition process 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2003: 18). In any case, as EU member states with a derogation, they will not  
 
____________________ 
12 For example, a current account deficit of more than 5 percent (and deteriorating) did not have a noticeable impact on the 
decision to include Portugal into the euro area. 
13 Note that all three countries that go for an introduction of the euro as early as possible and have already joined the ERM II 
belong to this group. 
14 The exceptionally high deficit of 12.9 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic is partly due to the inclusion of government 
guarantees in the deficit, which otherwise would have been 6.6 percent of GDP (ARGE 2004). 11 
Table 2: 
Indicators for Monetary Maastricht Criteria in the New Member States (percent) 
  Inflation rate (HICP)  Long-term interest rate 
  2001 2002 2003 2004a 2005a  2001 2002 2003 
Cyprus  2.0 2.8 4.0 2.2 2.1  7.7 5.4 4.7 
Czech Republic  4.5  1.4  –0.1 2.8 2.8  6.3 4.9 3.9 
Estonia  5.6 3.6 1.4 2.8 2.9  .  .  4.3 
Hungary  9.1 5.2 4.7 6.9 4.6  7.9 7.1 6.6 
Latvia  2.5 2.0 2.9 4.0 3.5  .  .  4.9 
Lithuania 1.3  0.4  –1.1  1.0  2.2  .  .  5.3 
Malta  .  .  1.3 1.8 1.9  6.1 5.7 5.0 
Poland  5.3 1.9 0.7 2.3 3.0 10.7 7.3 5.6 
Slovakia  7.2 3.5 8.5 8.2 4.5 10.7 7.3 5.6 
Slovenia  8.6 7.5 5.7 3.6 3.2  .  .  5.5 
Memorandum item:            
Euro  area  2.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6  5.0 4.9 4.1 
Critical Maastricht valueb 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.5  6.9 7.0 6.1 
aForecast. — bCalculated according to the respective criterion (see text). 
Source: European Commission (2004); own calculations.  
Table 3:  
Indicators for Fiscal Maastricht Criteria in the New Member States, 2001–2005 (percent of GDP) 
  General government budget balances  Gross public debt 
  2001 2002 2003  2004a 2005a 2001 2002 2003 2004a 2005a 
Cyprus  –2.4 –4.6 –6.5 –4.6 –4.1 64.4 67.1 72.2 74.6 76.9 
Czech Republic  –6.7  –6.4  –12.9  –5.9 –5.1 25.2 28.9 37.6 40.6 42.4 
Estonia  0.3 1.8 2.6 0.7 0.0 4.7 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 
Hungary  –4.4 –9.3 –5.9 –3.9 –4.3 53.5 57.1 59.0 58.7 58.0 
Lithuania  –2.1 –1.4 –1.7 –2.8 –2.6 33.4 22.8 21.9 22.8 23.2 
Latvia  –1.6 –2.7 –1.8 –2.2 –2.0 16.2 15.5 15.6 16.0 16.1 
Malta  –6.4 –5.7 –9.7 –5.9 –4.5 61.8 61.7 72.0 73.9 75.9 
Poland  –3.5 –3.6 –4.1 –6.0 –4.5 36.7 41.2 45.4 49.1 50.3 
Slovakia  –6.0 –5.7 –3.6 –4.1 –3.9 48.7 43.3 42.8 45.1 46.1 
Slovenia  –2.7 –1.9 –1.8 –1.7 –1.8 26.9 27.8 27.1 28.3 28.2 
Memorandum item:            
Euro  area  –1.6 –2.3 –2.7 –2.7 –2.6 69.4 69.2 70.4 70.9 70.9 
aForecast. 
Source: European Commission (2004). 
have to face sanctions. Although government programs currently do not let expect the deficit to fall 
below 3 percent in the foreseeable future, the correction of fiscal balances in order to comply with the 
Maastricht criteria seems to be achievable within the 4–5 years implied by the euro introduction target 
dates. In the latter half of the nineties many of the euro area member states managed to reduce their 
budget deficits from comparable or even higher levels without significant damage to economic growth 
(Table 4). Recently, Slovakia has demonstrated that cutting the budget deficit from 6 to 3½ percent 
within two years is possible without triggering a recession. 12 
Table 4:  
General Government Budget Balance in Euro Area States, 1994–1998 (percent of GDP) 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Austria  –5.0 –5.1 –3.8 –1.9 –2.4 
Belgium  –4.9 –3.8 –3.8 –2.0 –0.7 
Finland  –5.7 –3.9 –3.0 –1.3  1.6 
France  –5.8 –4.9 –4.1 –3.0 –2.7 
Germany  –2.4 –3.3 –3.4 –2.7 –2.2 
Ireland  –1.7 –2.1 –0.2  1.2  2.4 
Italy  –9.2 –7.7 –7.1 –2.7 –2.8 
Luxemburg  2.7 1.8 2.6 3.4 3.1 
Netherlands  –3.8 –4.1 –1.8 –1.1 –0.8 
Portugal  –6.0 –5.7 –4.0 –2.7 –2.6 
Spain  –6.2 –6.6 –4.9 –3.2 –2.7 
Source: European Commission (2004).  
However, currently the political impetus towards fiscal consolidation is lacking in most NMS with 
an excessive deficit, and last year’s suspension of the deficit procedure in the cases of Germany and 
France might lend support to a position of fiscal latitude. In addition, an argument can be made that 
the relatively high rate of nominal growth that can be expected for most of the NMS in the course of 
further convergence makes higher deficits more tolerable than in the original euro area countries 
(Gomulka 2003). The argument starts from the notion that Maastricht criteria have been deducted 
under the assumption of a 5 percent nominal GDP growth which, given the relationship between the 
deficit, the debt level, and nominal GDP growth, implies that the debt level stabilizes at 60 percent 
with a 3 percent deficit. Since the NMS can be expected to grow faster in the coming years, an un-
changed value of 60 percent for the tolerable debt level in relation to GDP would support a higher 
deficit. The argument, however, ignores that the current target of fiscal policy in EMU is not defined 
by the Treaty of Maastricht, but by the Stability and Growth Pact which demands a balanced budget 
over the medium term in order to consolidate the fiscal positions in face of the future strains on the 
public finances associated with the aging of the population. Against this background, it seems sensible 
to stick to the 3 percent limit even accounting for the higher trend growth, the fact that the fiscal 
position is generally sounder—the average debt-to-GDP ratio is around 40 percent in the NMS com-
pared to some 70 percent in the euro area—, and the greater needs for public investments.  
Taken together, an evaluation of the current position of the NMS with respect to the Maastricht 
criteria leads to the conclusion that, in general, they are already relatively well positioned, albeit with 
some notable exceptions, mainly on the fiscal front. There is, however, the possibility of a monetary 
policy inconsistency, namely that the inflation criterion might be inconsistent with the exchange rate 
criterion. The problem is rooted in the basic macroeconomic trilemma, the so-called impossible trinity, 
that policy makers cannot successfully pursue at the same time three basically desirable goals: 
stabilize the exchange rate, engage in monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals, and enjoy free 
capital mobility (Fischer 2001; Obstfeld et al. 2004). Given the freedom of capital flows established 
with the accession to the EU and simple interest parity, monetary policy activism in an NMS in order 
to target an inflation rate compatible with the Maastricht inflation criterion will be defeated by open 
capital markets if it is necessary to drive the local interest rate away from the euro rate and the 
exchange rate is credibly fixed. As the ERM II has fluctuation bands allowing for fluctuations of the 
exchange rate within a certain margin, the NMS, with the exception of those maintaining currency 
boards, will have some but strictly limited degree of monetary policy discretion.  
A problem of inconsistency might arise because the NMS can be expected to have structurally 
higher inflation—or structural real appreciation—relative to the euro area. If the structural inflation 
differential is large enough, it may be impossible for some NMS to simultaneously achieve both 13 
sufficiently low inflation to comply with the Maastricht criterion and exchange rate stability in the 
sense of the exchange rate criterion at the same time. One prominent mechanism often cited to be 
responsible for the structural inflation is the so-called Balassa–Samuelson (B-S) effect, which results 
from relatively strong productivity and wage growth in the tradable goods sector that spills over into 
higher wages and higher inflation in the nontradable goods sector.15 While empirical studies have 
unanimously found B-S to be relevant in the NMS,16 there is some variance in the estimated size of 
the effect ranging from less than 1 to 4 percentage points, depending on the method and the countries 
investigated (Mihaljek and Klau 2003).17 The relevance of B-S for the problem of monetary 
inconsistency seems to be limited, however, for basically two very different reasons. First, the effect is 
probably not large enough to compromise the achievement of sufficiently low inflation with a stable 
exchange rate, partly because the share of market services in the CPI is very low at around 30 percent 
in the NMS (compared to some 60 percent in Germany, for example), which leads to relatively small 
effects of productivity growth differentials on the inflation differential in terms of the CPI (Egert et al. 
2003). This argument can be illustrated by the experience of very low inflation, even negative 
inflation, in a number of NMS in the recent past despite continued high productivity growth in the 
tradable goods sector. Therefore, the leeway for real appreciation might be large enough even 
assuming a narrow fluctuation band of ± 2.25 percent. Second, the Maastricht criterion of exchange 
rate stability is preoccupied with devaluation, and B-S is about revaluation and therefore much less of 
a concern. Even if the narrow fluctuation band were relevant on the downside, an appreciation beyond 
the strong edge of the narrow fluctuation band would almost certainly be tolerated. A case in point is 
the development of the Greek drachma in the run-up to the introduction of the euro in Greece on 
January 1, 2001 (Kontolemis 2003: 31). Following an initial devaluation, capital inflows threatened 
the attainment of the Maastricht inflation criterion as they drove down interest rates in a situation 
where inflationary pressures were already on the rise. In response, the central bank allowed an ap-
preciation of the currency relative to the central parity by 7 percent on average and initiated a program 
of sterilization of capital flows. Finally, the central parity was even adjusted upwards (to what even-
tually would be the conversion rate for the adoption of the euro) within the obligatory period of two 
years of ERM II membership, without negatively affecting the planned introduction of the euro as a 
legal tender. More generally, the experience during the accession to EMU in Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece suggests that nominal and real convergence processes do not conflict with a successful adop-
tion of the euro (Jarocinski 2003).  
In sum, capital inflows and real appreciation in the run-up to EMU are likely to be problems of 
limited relevance for qualifying for the introduction of the euro. This result implies that the co-
existence of structural real appreciation and the need to qualify for entry into full EMU membership 
does not rule out extreme exchange rate strategies during transition, which are reviewed in some detail 
in the next section. Neither is it to be expected that a fixed exchange rate would lead to excessive 
inflation (measured against the Maastricht criteria), nor would we expect an inflation targeting strategy 
to drive a flexible exchange rate out of the ERM II band because of structural appreciation alone. 
Nevertheless there is still the risk of financial markets testing the lower edge of the fluctuation 
bands.18 In order to minimize the risk of a currency crisis during the ERM II membership phase,  
 
____________________ 
15 For an exposition see Froot and Rogoff (1995), for an extended model see Fischer (2004). 
16 Studies have generally been confined to Central and Eastern European countries. 
17 The real appreciation of NMS currencies in recent years can, however, only partly be explained by B-S. Other possible 
influences, many of which in the meantime can be expected to have lost impact with the progress of transformation, include, 
as indicated in the previous section, a correction of an initial situation of currency undervaluation, a structural shift towards 
private and government consumption, capital inflows due to higher real interest rates and privatization, price liberalization 
and terms of trade improvements due to improved quality or marketing of export products (Halpern and Wyplosz 1997; 
Deutsche Bundesbank 2002). 
18 This risk may be greater the longer a country stay in the ERM II (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2004). 14 
implementing a consistent and credible set of macroeconomic policies, with an orientation at 
achieving the Maastricht criteria, will be an important—although not necessarily sufficient—signal to 
the markets. 
4  Alternative Strategies on the Road to the Euro 
In the NMS a currency peg has in general been an important ingredient of the initial process of macro-
economic stabilization, but exchange rate strategies have evolved differently over time. Currently, the 
observed exchange rate regimes include a multitude of exchange rate regimes, including fixed ex-
change rates, exchange rate bands, managed floating and free floating (see Table 1 in the previous 
section). In the following the extreme options chosen are discussed in more detail, namely forgoing 
the possibility of an autonomous monetary policy by introducing a currency board system and the im-
plementation of an inflation targeting regime, which requires exchange rate flexibility. 
4.1  Early Euroization—the Currency Boards 
New and old member states of the EU have strikingly different views on currency boards. The two 
Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, use currency board systems in order to 
shorten the transition to EU and EMU membership, respectively. This can best be exemplified by the 
position of Estonia which is expressed in the countries’ Pre-Accession Economic Programme 2003 
(cited in Backé and Thimann 2004: 7): “Estonia will present an application to join the ERM II 
exchange rate mechanism immediately after EU accession in 2004… Estonia wants to keep a fixed 
exchange rate and the financial framework supporting the currency board system up to euro area 
accession and as a part of the ERM II framework, taking it as a unilaterally binding obligation to hold 
exchange rate stability.” 
On the contrary, it is only a few years ago that both the ECB and ECOFIN thought that a currency 
board was inconsistent with the ERM II. Although this strict position has been weakened and the 
official position is that it is possible for countries entering the ERM II with a currency board to keep it, 
the ECB still tries to slow down euroization as much as possible. The cautious view of the ECB is best 
exemplified by the bank’s recent Occasional Paper (Backé and Thimann 2004: 60f.). Although the 
authors try very hard to come up with arguments against a short transition to full EMU membership, 
they have to admit that “acceding countries display some commonalities with the euro area that may 
bode well for future monetary integration” and that “monetary integration shall be facilitated in coun-
tries where fiscal deficits and public debt are limited, stability-oriented policies are fully maintained 
and further structural policies are implemented.” Nevertheless, even if the “consistency of domestic 
macroeconomic policies and the sustainability of convergence in general are fully preserved … several 
important caveats have to be made … It would be premature to draw conclusions about the country’s 
readiness for membership in ERM II and for a subsequent adoption of the euro. Moreover, the choice 
of the central parity within ERM II is a key issue … a potential misalignment in these countries is a 
risk that cannot be ignored … (and, finally) … the absence of significant foreign exchange market 
pressure in the past cannot be taken as implying an absence of such pressure in the future”. Taking this 
rationale seriously would mean that the Maastricht criteria are meaningless. This conclusion may be 
right but is surely not the intention of the authors. It also implies that there would be hardly any 
country ever joining the club which is perfect from the insiders’ point of view. 
Historically, currency boards were implemented in dependent territories with the currency of 
the colonial power acting as the anchor currency. However, the 1990s saw a revival of the idea in 15 
Argentina and in a number of transition countries; Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina implemented currency boards in situations of acute economic and political crisis (Hanke 
2000). Estonia had just gained independence from the USSR and was still using the hyperinflating 
Russian ruble. Lithuania was in the grip of a collapsing real economy and very high inflation. To make 
matters worse, its new political institutions could not effectively control what threatened to be a 
runaway fiscal deficit. Bulgaria had defaulted on its international debt, narrowly escaped a revolution 
in late 1996 and was battling hyperinflation that had virtually wiped out its banking system and sent 
the real economy into a free fall. 
The main characteristics of a currency board are as follows (Schuler 2004): 
•  A currency board maintains full, unlimited convertibility between its notes and coins and the anchor 
currency at a fixed rate of exchange. 
•  A currency board’s reserves are adequate to ensure that all holders of its notes and coins can convert 
them into the reserve currency or a commodity. 
•  A currency board does not try to influence interest rates by establishing a discount rate like a typical 
central bank. 
•  A currency board has no share in the profits of banks, it has no responsibility for acting as a lender 
of last resort to protect them from losses. 
•  Due to these features, a currency board has no discretionary power because the amount of national 
money is regulated by reserve flows.  
While the exchange rate systems in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria deviate from the orthodoxy 
defined above, they are in essence currency board systems.19 Hence evaluating the pros and cons of 
currency board systems, one can refer to the discussion on euroization. This is because currency board 
systems still keep national currencies (and collect seigniorage) but the mechanisms of money supply 
are basically the same as in a situation where a country unilaterally introduces the anchor currency and 
has no influence on monetary policy. Therefore, currency boards can be interpreted as a weak form of 
euroization. The euroization debate is summarized by Belke and Hebler (2003). The following 
arguments can be put forward in favor of euroization: 
•  After accession to the EU and in the run-up to EMU, the ERM  II countries will be attractive 
locations for capital inflows which bear the risk of sudden reversals and financial crisis. Because the 
ERM II provides no insurance against such dangers, euroization could provide a risk-minimizing 
strategy (Begg et al. 2001).  
•  Euroization can be expected to decrease real exchange rate (excess) volatility and reduce the costs 
of structural adjustment that fall on investment and labor markets (Belke and Gros 2001). 
•  Euroization could also foster the use of the euro in neighboring regions and create a European 
stability zone (Gros 2000). 
•  Potential risks for the euro area stemming from weak financial institutions in former transition 
countries can be expected to be either low or even lower due to euroization (Nuti 2002). Additional-
ly, euroization strategies do not imply that the ECB has to act as a lender of last resort.  
As Section 2 has shown, one should not be overly optimistic concerning the quantitative effects of 
euroization. However, qualitatively, all these arguments imply that a currency board or the introduc-
tion of the euro can reduce the risk of financial turmoil in the transition period compared to other fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that fixed exchange rate regimes are 
more crisis-prone than flexible exchange rate regimes (Bubula and Otker-Robe 2004). Hence, it de-
pends on the interpretation of the nature of the ERM II. At the start, a band width of ± 15 percent 
____________________ 
19 Apart from very small economies like the Bermudas, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, and the Faeroe Islands, 
only Hong Kong fulfills the definition of an orthodox currency board. 16 
implies that the ERM II is rather a flexible exchange rate system. However, with the introduction of 
the euro and the decision on the conversion rate coming closer, the pressure to defend the central 
parity may increase and the ERM II is likely to become a de facto fixed exchange rate system. This 
implies that countries entering the ERM II with a currency board should definitely stick to this ex-
change rate regime.  
For the NMS in general, the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory implies that they should better 
wait to narrow exchange rate bands until certain conditions are fulfilled. However, it is difficult to 
judge on critical values. This is a problem that some studies tried to circumvent by comparative 
indicators, which lead to a ranking of countries with respect to the optimality of fixing exchange rates 
to the euro. In an early study, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) calculated an OCA indicator by means 
of regression analysis. Here, the estimated relationship between the variables that—according to the 
literature on optimum currency areas—measure benefits and costs of a fixed exchange rate, and the 
standard variation of bilateral exchange rate is used to calculate an expected variability of bilateral 
euro exchange rates. The lower this variability the higher the net benefits of fixing the exchange rate to 
the euro. Other studies use indicator approaches which aggregate a wider range of indicators including 
credibility arguments by means of standardization with respect to a control group of EMU member 
countries (Schweickert 2001a) or the average of the analyzed countries (DBResearch 2004). 
Notwithstanding some significant differences and given the different sample of indicators and 
procedures, the general result from the three studies is strikingly similar. A first result is that it is not 
the small countries that appear on the top of the list. The highest net benefits are rather found for larger 
but at the same time more advanced countries like Slovenia and Hungary. Consequently, the three 
countries with currency board systems and especially Bulgaria show only relatively low net benefits of 
euroization (which is a sensible result, as, if one sees a currency board as a weaker form of euro-
ization, the countries that adopt the former already derive some of the expected benefits from the 
later). However, a second result from the studies which include an EMU control group reveal that net 
benefits are also quite low for Ireland, the star performer among the current EMU member countries. 
For Ireland, other studies even reveal that the net benefits from dollarization would be much higher 
than the net benefits from euroization (Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil 2000). This result implies 
that a currency board system can make sense even in larger countries and in countries that, according 
to OCA criteria, derive rather low net benefits from a fixed exchange rate.  
The general literature on currency boards shows that currency boards are only one element of a 
stabilization package which aims at reducing inflation drastically in the short run and which includes a 
complete and radical reform of all policy areas in order to improve the functioning of market forces. 
Only such a full-fledged program constitutes credibility. The currency board as a rule to restrict money 
supply on the basis of domestic assets needs rather than produces credibility (Schweickert 1998a). In 
order to preserve the viability of currency boards countries need to maintain strict policy discipline 
and be prepared to deal with large capital inflows and asymmetric shocks (Gulde-Wolf et al. 2000). 
Hence, emerging market economies with currency boards need an opt-out strategy because a flexible 
exchange rate system is more adequate to smooth real exchange rate adjustment and to maintain real 
growth of GDP which is, after successful stabilization, the primary target of macroeconomic policy 
(Schweickert 1996). Contrary to other countries like Argentina, EU member countries and the remain-
ing accession countries are in the privileged position that they have a fully credible opt-out strategy, 
i.e., the adoption of the euro.  
Over a longer period of time, this has already been exercised by Ireland (Schweickert 1998b). As 
was the case in the transition countries, the Irish currency board was introduced when the country be-
came independent in 1927. The peg to the British pound was maintained until 1979 when the country 
entered and maintained membership in the various European exchange rate mechanisms. Finally, the 
macroeconomic reforms that started in the 1980s allowed the country to become an undebated 
founding member of the EMU. The Irish experience exemplifies that meeting OCA criteria may help 17 
to sustain a fixed exchange rate, but the criteria are endogenous to some extent and they do not 
constitute necessary conditions for successful monetary integration. Success is rather determined by 
the credibility and consistency of the macroeconomic reforms designed around the currency board 
system.  
The experience with the currency board systems in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria support this 
argument (Gulde-Wolf and Keller 2002). As shown in Figure 4, inflation has been brought to low 
single digits in all three countries, while the (above-average) real appreciation is based on an above-
average growth performance after the deep transition crises. The macroeconomic performance was 
supported by a prudent fiscal stance, and even external shocks, such as the Russian crisis in 1998–
1999, have not led to persistent current account imbalances if it is accounted for the fact that they have 
been partly or fully financed by foreign direct investment flows. At least, there is no evidence that the 
absence of an active exchange rate policy and the constraints placed by the currency board exacerbated 
the effects of external shocks or led to increasing internal or external imbalances while, at the same 
time, the discipline demanded by the currency board system may have supported structural reforms.  
This is most evident in the case of Estonia (Schweickert 2001b). With respect to trade liberalization 
and fiscal consolidation Estonia figures prominently among the transition countries. Radical reforms 
were introduced with the start of the currency board, which was not called into question ever since its 
introduction. The situation was different in Lithuania, where authorities planned to opt out from the 
currency board as soon as stabilization would be achieved. However, the success of the currency board 
strategy as well as the perspective of joining the ERM together with Estonia has led Lithuania to 
switch from the US dollar to the euro as the anchor currency and to maintain the currency board until 
full membership in EMU. Bulgaria introduced the currency board even later than Lithuania but the 
stabilization achieved since 1997 has been remarkable as well. Implementation of complementary 
reforms allowed Bulgaria to outpace Romania with respect to institutional reforms and to establish its 
position as one of the next countries to enter the EU (Gawrich and Schweickert 2004). 
Hence, more than just a currency board is necessary in order to provide stability, but for countries 
which are determined to introduce the euro a currency board system may help to establish and 
maintain credibility within a consistent macroeconomic strategy. 
4.2  Gradual Euroization—Inflation Targeting Regimes 
Inflation targeting is the announcement by the monetary authority of a formal target or target range for 
the inflation rate, at one or more future time horizons (due to this it is also called direct inflation 
targeting as it does not rely, in principle, on intermediate targets like monetary aggregates). It ex-
plicitly acknowledges that price level stability is the overriding goal of monetary policy, therefore 
eliminating the problem of potentially conflicting policy objectives. For inflation targeting to work 
properly, it necessarily implies increased accountability and transparency by the monetary authority 
(Rudebusch and Svensson 1999). Inflation targeting is not a fixed rule but it is better understood as a 
policy framework, whose major advantages are increased transparency, coherence of policy, and room 
for, in the famous Bernanke and Mishkin (1997: 104) expression, “constrained discretion” by the 
monetary authority. 
Among the NMS, the three economically largest transition countries Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary preferred keeping exchange rate policy in their hands over importing monetary 
credibility from an advanced economy such as Germany.20 These countries moved gradually away 
 
____________________ 
20 When one compares the list of countries that adopted currency boards in the previous section and this list of NMS that 
chose inflation targeting, there are indications of the so-called question of endogeneity of exchange rate regime choice on the 
economic features of a country (Poirson 2001). 18 
Figure 4: 
Indicators of Economic Performance in the New Member States with Currency Board Systems, 1992–2003 
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from fixed exchange rates and introduced different types of inflation targeting frameworks as their 
monetary policy strategies till they join EMU. Both Poland and the Czech Republic started with a 
fixed exchange rate system, which became more flexible during the 1990s (Schweickert 2001b; 
Vinhas de Souza et al. 1999). In Poland the transition from fixed exchange rates to inflation targeting 
happened through a long, phased-in process that lasted from 1991 to 2000 (National Bank of Poland 
1998),21 while in the Czech Republic inflation targeting arose from an exchange rate crisis (Czech 
National Bank 2003; Hrnčíř 1997) and was implemented rather swiftly, roughly during the second half 
of 1997. In Hungary, contrary to Poland and the Czech Republic, monetary policy has been character-
ized by some form of pegged exchange rate over the entire period of the last 14 years (National Bank 
of Hungary 2001; Neményi 1997; Surányi 2002). Here, inflation targeting was implemented in com-
bination with the ERM  II shadowing bands from mid-2001 onwards. VAR-based estimations 
(Hammermann 2004b) do confirm, to different degrees, the effectiveness of a inflation targeting 
framework for the three countries above (as one would expect from the previous description, the 
weakest signs are found for Hungary, where an exchange rate stabilization component in the behavior 
of the monetary authority is more significant). 
There is an ongoing debate on the optimality of inflation targeting regimes for emerging market 
economies. The critics can be classified into three groups (Truman 2003: 55–58): Inflation targeting is 
(1) too soft, (2) too rigid, and (3) would not work. The proponents of the “too soft” argument are 
afraid that a change in preferences about inflation might lead to a change in the corresponding in-
flation target. The inflation target is not rigid enough to fulfill the requirements of a nominal anchor, 
as it can be changed. The proponents of the “too rigid” argument are afraid that inflation targeting 
would be an unnecessary constraint. This argument is mainly limited to the currencies of advanced 
economies such as the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen. The proponents of the “would not 
work” argument are afraid that implementing an inflation targeting framework might be too demand-
ing for many countries. All three arguments do not apply to the three EMU accession countries 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In these countries inflation targeting is not “too soft.” The 
Maastricht criteria guide the inflation target. There is no room for a change in inflation preferences. 
The critique that inflation targeting is “too rigid” does not apply to emerging market and transition 
countries. Here, a rigid framework is quite welcome to build up credibility. The last argument that in-
flation targeting “would not work” can also be rejected, as all three countries have managed to im-
plement an effective inflation targeting framework, although with some limitations in the case of 
Hungary.  
Following Jonas and Mishkin (2003: 5) and the work by Debelle (1997) and Schaechter et al. 
(2000) the requirements for a successful implementation of an inflation targeting framework comprise 
seven key elements: a strong fiscal position, a well-understood transmission mechanism between 
monetary policy instruments and inflation, a well-developed financial system, central bank indepen-
dence and a clear mandate for price level stability, a reasonably well-developed ability to forecast 
inflation, absence of other nominal anchors, and transparent and accountable monetary policy. Surányi 
(2002: 185) points out that transition countries have particularly poor knowledge about the trans-
mission mechanism, whereas Jonas and Mishkin (2003: 5) conclude that the degree of fulfillment 
matters for inflation targeting and that “… the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland met these require-
ments to a sufficient degree to make inflation targeting feasible and useful.” 
____________________ 
21  Statistical break point tests show that the period between February and March 1998 is the relevant regime change 
(Hammermann 2004a; Wickham 2002: 22). The widening of the band in February 1998 marked the change in the regime and 
not the announcement of the first inflation target in September 1998 or moving to completely flexible exchange rates in April 
2000. The delay between the taking office of the new Monetary Policy Council, widening of the exchange rate band, and 
announcing inflation targeting on the one hand and introducing de jure flexible exchange rates on the other hand can be 
explained by the fact that changes in the exchange rate policy had to be undertaken jointly by the Cabinet and the central 
bank (Kokoszczyński 2002: 201–202). 20 
One prominent problem (beyond the fiscal position of these countries) remains: the prevailing 
exchange rate arrangements and the prerequisite that there should not be any other nominal anchors 
beside the inflation target. Truman (2003) devotes a whole chapter to this problem. He concludes that 
“… an inflation-targeting framework … does not narrowly proscribe the type of exchange rate regime 
inflation targeters should adopt” (2003: 189) and that “… under some circumstances, a regime that in-
volves relatively heavy management of the exchange rate may be not only viable but also appropriate” 
(2003: 190). Further, Truman advocates Williamson’s Band, Basket and Crawl (BBC) approach and 
Goldstein’s Managed Floating Plus approach for inflation targeters. Williamson (2000) recommends 
the combination of an exchange rate crawl pegged to a basket of currencies with a band to allow for 
fluctuations. Till the mid-1990s such a crawl reinforced the Chilean inflation target and contributed to 
the disinflation process. 
As inflation rates have already converged to low levels in the three EMU accession countries, 
Williamson’s BBC approach might not be relevant for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In-
stead, Goldstein’s Managed Floating Plus (2002) might be more appropriate. He recommends a com-
bination of managed floating and inflation targeting. Sterilized interventions would reduce excessive 
short-term fluctuations in exchange rates while the long-term trend would be fully determined by mar-
ket forces (Goldstein 2002: 43). Truman (2003: 190) emphasizes that the relationship between the in-
flation-targeting framework and exchange rate policy needs to be clear. For the three EMU accession 
countries managing their exchange rates is not inconsistent with inflation targeting. The next step, i.e., 
joining the ERM II, indicates clearly in which direction the countries move. The previously quoted 
ECB work (Backé and Thimann 2004: 21) states that “… early entry into ERM II could be seen as less 
problematic for countries that have followed a unilateral ‘ERM II shadowing’ strategy …” 
The adoption of inflation targeting by the NMS is also supported by empirical evidence on the over-
all improvement in macroeconomic performance under inflation targeting (Hu 2003). The empirical 
analysis of 66 countries for the period 1980–2000 revealed that inflation was reduced and growth 
improved. Additionally, the variability of growth is significantly reduced. Indicators of economic 
performance in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary also point into this direction (Figure 5). All 
three countries converged to single-digit inflation rates. Poland and the Czech Republic, i.e., the two 
countries with strong commitment to the inflation target, achieved particularly low inflation rates. As 
was the case for the currency board countries, the average inflation rates for the inflation targeters are 
below the average for all CEEC. Thus, inflation targeting regimes and currency board systems seem to 
be superior strategies for reducing and keeping inflation low.22 Due to the flexibility of the exchange 
rates the inflation targeters achieved this result with below-average real appreciation, a feature that 
contributes to the viability of the strategy. However, Figure 5 also reveals that, contrary to the cur-
rency board countries, economic growth was below-average in the recent years and that this was ac-
companied by increasing and above-average fiscal deficits. Hence, while the central banks of Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary are well on track to join the euro area, their governments have to 
contribute by meeting the fiscal requirements in order to meet the Maastricht criteria but, even more 








22 The capacity of credible inflation targeting regimes to mimic the nominal stabilization properties normally associated with 
harder regimes had already been pointed out in Vinhas de Souza (2002). 21 
Figure 5: 
Indicators of Economic Performance in the New Member States with Inflation Targeting Regimes, 1992–2003 
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aAnnual inflation of consumer price index in percent. — bGDP growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. — cGovernment budget balance is based on the central government’s current 
and capital revenue and official grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. — dAdjusted current 
account is based on the sum of current account balance and net flows of foreign direct investment divided by GDP. — eReal 
effective exchange rate is based on the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate divided by a price deflator. — fAverage of 
CEEC consists of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Source:  DekaBank (2004); Economist Intelligence Unit (various issues); IMF (2004b); Thomson Financial 
Datastream, “Real effective exchange rate” of various countries accessed on September 3, 2004; World Bank 
(2004); own calculations. 22 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
The overview provided in this paper demonstrated that expectations about additional short-run gains 
from joining monetary union should not be too optimistic. Most of the expected gains from a monetary 
union are largely endogenous to credible, time-consistent domestic policies. Mere euro area member-
ship is not a replacement for that. However, monetary integration has a role in supporting such policies 
and completing monetary integration, i.e., joining the monetary union can lock in the gains realized so 
far.  
The inspection of the NMS status with respect to the monetary and fiscal Maastricht criteria shows 
that the NMS already made considerable progress in this respect. However, inflation is still a concern 
in some countries and fiscal deficits in relation to GDP are considerably high, when measured against 
the 3 percent limit, for the majority of countries. Experience in the run-up to EMU in the second half 
of the nineties shows that disinflation and fiscal consolidation in similar proportions have been 
achieved in a number of countries without major damage to growth. Because fears about structural real 
appreciation seem to be overblown, credible options for the transitional exchange rate system 
consistent with real appreciation and fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria include currency boards as 
well as inflation targeting.  
The experience with the currency board systems in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria reveals that 
successful convergence towards EU stability standards is rather determined by credibility and con-
sistency of the macroeconomic reforms that are designed around the currency board. There is no evi-
dence that the absence of an active exchange rate policy and the constraints placed by the currency 
board exacerbated the effects of external shocks or led to increasing internal or external imbalances. 
However, at the same time, the discipline demanded by the currency board system may have sup-
ported structural reforms. Hence, more than just a currency board is necessary for economic stability, 
but for countries which are determined to introduce the euro a currency board system may help to 
establish and maintain credibility within a consistent macroeconomic strategy. 
The inflation targeters Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are also well on track to join the 
euro area. All three arguments usually put forward against inflation targeting do not apply for EMU 
accession countries. Inflation targeting is not “too soft” because the Maastricht criteria guide the 
inflation target, inflation targeting is not “too rigid” because a rigid framework is quite welcomed to 
build up credibility, and, finally, the inflation-targeting-“would not work” argument can also be re-
jected because all three countries—although with some limitations in the case of Hungary—managed 
to implement an inflation targeting framework and, like the currency board countries, clearly outper-
formed the average CEEC with respect to monetary stability. To be successful, inflation targeting has 
to be accompanied by thorough banking supervision and thorough fiscal policy: the governments have 
also to meet their fiscal requirements.  
Hence, there is no generally superior exchange rate regime that provides a golden way to bridge the 
transition period to full EMU membership. While there is no reason to view monetary integration with 
rose-tinted glasses, there is also no reason to believe that the ERM II provides a safe haven with 
respect to financial stability. It is not evident that countries with sound and consistent macro policies 
and fulfilling all criteria—be it Copenhagen or Maastricht—gain anything from just participating in 
the ERM II. Rather, they still run the risk that market sentiment turns against them even with all the 
homework done. Hence, the most important value added of joining EMU is to lock in the gains from 
real and monetary integration that the NMS have achieved so far.  23 
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